Introduction
After World War II, the Allied Powers designed an institutional framework for Germany that constrained the executive power of the new regime and dispersed its competences. The reason to convert Germany into a semi-sovereign state was the strong and powerful executive of the previous years (Schmidt, 2003: 26). However, is it possible that the main leader of the executive (the chancellor) could increase his formal and informal powers without significant changes in the Basic Law (German constitution)? In other words, does consensus democracy prevent from presidentialization?
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first one, the patterns of democracy (Lijphart, 1999), especially the consensus model, are explained. Moreover, it is demonstrated that Germany belongs to the consensus pattern. In the second one, the process of presidentialization is presented as the study of Poguntke & Webb (2005) has established. Herein, the concept is defined, the arenas where presidentialization occurs are described and the factors that contribute to them are listed. These arenas are the executive, the political party and the electoral process. In the third section, the question of the paper is answered focusing only on the executive arena of German politics. This arena is the most representative for German presidentialization, because the consensus democracy limits the power of the executive. Thus, the study of the possible changes towards presidentialization in this arena shows the effectiveness of consensual democracy to prevent this process. Finally, in the conclusion, it is held that presidentialization is occurring in Germany and consensus democracy cannot curb that. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to study the consequences of presidentialization in German democracy.
Consensus Democracy
In 1999, Lijphart published a very useful tool to classify democracies. He identifies in his book (Lijphart, 1999) two different patterns of democracy: the Westminster or majoritarian model and the consensus model. On the one hand, the first model –Lijphart establishes– is “the government by the majority and in accordance with the majority’s wishes” (1999: 2). This majoritarian model “concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority” and is an “exclusive, competitive and adversial” (ibid.) model of democracy. On the other hand, the second model is a democracy “characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise”, the consensus model “tries to share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways”; this government includes “as many people as possible” (ibid.). To exemplify the two patterns, Lijphart considers Great Britain (before Blair), Barbados and especially New Zealand (until 1996) as prototypes of majoritarian democracies. Switzerland, Belgium (after 1993) and the European Union are prototypes of consensus democracies.
The author identifies ten characteristics that differentiate the two models of democracy. These are divided into two separate dimensions with five characteristics in each one. The first dimension is labelled as executives-parties and the second as federal-unity. The ten characteristics are listed below and, according to Lijphart classification, Germany is situated in each one. The first five characteristics correspond to the executives-parties dimension and the latter five to the federal-unity dimension:
1.- Cabinets: concentration versus sharing of executive powers. Majoritarian democracy use to have cabinets consisting only of members of the same party, in consensus democracy normally “let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad coalition” (Lijphat, 1999: 34). Almost all the governments in the Western Germany and reunified Germany have been coalitions (Sodaro, 2008: 538).
2.- Executive-Legislative relations. In the Westminster model, the executive is situated in a prominent position in comparison with Parliament. In non-majoritarian models, there is a balance between these two powers. Germany is, clearly, a parliamentarian regime where the Bundestag (Lower House) and Bundesrat (Upper House) have strong powers.
3.- Party system. The first model tends to be a two-party system, while the second is a multiparty one. Schmidt claims that the German party system is changing “from pluralistic fragmentation to a polarized pluralism” (2003: 135); in any case, it is clear that Germany has a multiparty system.
4.- Electoral system. Westminster uses a majoritarian and disproportional method whereas consensus uses a proportional one. The German electoral system is highly complex, but its index of disproportionality is very low (Lijphart, 1999: 313), so it could be easily catalogued as a proportional electoral system.
5.- Interest groups. Pluralism is likely to be found in majoritarian models, whilst corporatism is typically in consensus. In Germany, the mediation of government among interest groups is used normally and, moreover, there are four peak association groups: business and labour organizations, and churches and farmers’ interest groups. These two facts are distinctive of corporativist countries.
6.- Division of power. The majoritarian model tends to have a unitary and centralized government, while the consensus model tends to have a federal and decentralized government. Germany is a Federal Republic and the power of Länder is protected by the Basic Law (art. 30). (Jeffery, 2003)
7.- Division of legislative power: Unicameralism vs. strong bicameralism. Lijphart points out two conditions for strong bicameralism both of which Germany accomplishes: firstly, the procedure to elect Upper House (Bundesrat) has to be different from the election of the members of Lower House (Bundestag), and, secondly, both houses must have similar powers in the legislation.
8.- Constitutional rigidity. Flexible constitutions are typical of the Westminster model, whereas constitutions that need special majorities to be changed are in consensual democracies. Germany has a rigid constitution that needs extraordinary majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and other requirements, to reform it.
9.- Judicial review of laws. Majoritarian models do not have constitutional courts with powers to modify laws approved by Parliament, whilst the consensus model has strong judicial review institutions. The German ‘Federal Constitutional Court’ is considered as one of the most powerful judicial review institutions (Tsebelis, 2002: 231).
10.- Central banks. Executive-dependent central banks are normal in majoritarian models, while independent ones are common in consensus democracies. The Bundesbank was a strong and autonomous central bank and the European Central Bank maintains the main characteristics of the German one.
It can be observed that in each difference between the two patterns of democracy, Germany is situated in the consensus model. In the same way, Lijphart considers that Germany “could also have served as the prototype” of this pattern (1999: 249). Moreover, Poguntke states that “German democracy (. . .) should be characterized as ‘negotiation democracy’, where the power is dispersed between different levels and arenas of governance” (2005: 66); these are also the attributes of consensus democracy.
Therefore, Germany has been chosen for our case of study because it is a well-known country and it is a good example of consensual democracy . This country is used to see the influence of presidentialization in consensual democracies.
Presidentialization
Poguntke and Webb have defined presidentialization as “a process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal structure, that is, their regime-type” (2005: 1). This section, following the study of Poguntke and Webb, is divided into three parts. Firstly, the effects caused by presidential regime are explained, because this regime is the model for presidentializations. Secondly, the arenas or faces where presidentialization occurs are described. Lastly, the factors that contribute to this process, which can be structural or contingent, are pointed out.
The authors have claimed that the presidential regime is essential to understand the process of presidentialization, because it is the model that the dynamics of other regimes follow. Therefore, in their study three broad effects caused by this regime are identified. First, the competences granted to the president let him govern without important external interferences from other powers, because in this type of regime he is not responsible to the Parliament. Second, the institutional position of the president gives autonomy to the leader from the pressure of the party. Finally, the personalization –the prominence of the leader at the expense of parties and collective identities (Karvonen, 2007: 4)– in the electoral process influence the result of elections.
These three effects allow the authors to establish three arenas or faces where the presidentialization takes place. The first one is used for the research question, the other ones are succinctly explained for the sake of completeness. To start with, the executive arena. In this face, the leader tends to expand his power toward the rest of the cabinet and the legislative power. In the second place, the party arena. The leader of the political party tends to enhance his powers weakening the territorial leaders and he also takes control of party machinery. In the last place, the electoral arena. The focus on the personality and charisma of the leader is brought by the media brings to candidate-centred campaigns, and the ideology, electoral program and parties are relegated.
Two groups of factors explain the process of presidentialization. According to Poguntke and Webb, these groups are: structural factors and contingent factors. The structural group includes four factors: internationalization of politics, growth and complexity of the state, changing structure of mass communication and erosion of political cleavages. The first two affect only the executive arena, and the fourth, the electoral process; while the third influences the three arenas. Regarding the contingent group, the authors have identified two factors: the personality of leaders and the political context, which also affect the three arenas.
In the next section, the executive arena and its related factors are used to study the effect of presidentialization in German consensus democracy. It is important to remember, then, that the factors which influence this arena are internationalization of politics, growth and complexity of the state, changing structure of mass communication, the personality of leaders and the political context.
Presidentialization in German consensus democracy
Germany has been classified previously as a consensus democracy. Moreover, this country is considered as a semi-sovereign state and a Parteienstaat (party state) (Schmidt, 2003: Chapter 2; Poguntke, 2005: 63). The power of the chancellor, as a consequence of this pattern of democracy, is restrained and with fewer competences than other executives such as the Prime Minister of United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the chancellor’s position, according to the Basic Law, is more powerful than the rest of the members of the cabinet and has a certain stability from the Parliament due to the “constructive vote of no confidence” (Basic Law, art. 67); however, the executive power is dispersed and limited. Surprisingly, the chancellor has taken advantage of the resources of his position, and the process of presidentialization has occurred. The executive arena and the contingent and structural factors that affect this arena are used to examine how this process has occurred in Germany after World War II.
The first structural factor is the internationalization of politics. In Europe, two main processes are enhancing this factor: globalization (common to the entire world) and Europeanization (exclusive of members of the European Union); these processes are essential for the state and, hence, the foreign policy is also fundamental. The chancellor directly leads this policy; moreover, international and European summits contribute to the personification of politics and due to that, the chancellor enhances his powers at the expense of Parliament and Länder. However, it is important to remark that these international processes produce a loss of sovereignty of the states and that affects, also, the competences of the executive.
The second structural factor is the growth and complexity of the state. In the last 60 years, the states have increased their competences and they have specialized their departments. In the case of Germany, it is also a federal state and, then, its complexity is larger. Therefore, the chancellor has to deal with this complexity with restrained powers. He has the “pivotal role as chief negotiator in the negotiations” (Poguntke, 2009: 13) and that is the key to managing this complexity. This key has also contributed to enhancing his executive powers. Two examples of this negotiation role are listed. For example, the increasing powers of Bundesrat in the legislation have required several negotiations and the chancellor is the mediator between Land governments, federal government and the Parliament. Second example, Germany is a corporativist country and that “has given rise to a tradition of policy-making through special commissions and advisory councils that put the chancellor (. . .) at the centre stage” (Poguntke, 2005: 69). Finally, as coordinator of the executive and chief negotiator, the chancellor’s office (Bundeskanzleramt) has had to increase its size. According to data presented in Poguntke (2005: 70), Adenauer’s office had 120 staff, whereas in the late 1990s, it increased to 500, “which makes it one of the largest of its kind in Western Europe” (ibid.).
The third structural factor is the changing structure of mass communication. Poguntke & Webb have stated that the important changes in the mass media in the last 50 years have provided a “crucial power resource for chief executives to dominate their government” (2005: 17). The focus of media in the leadership of the chancellor gives him a preeminent position at the expense of the cabinet and the party. In other words, the media is expecting an opinion of the chancellor in each political issue and his posture, formally or informally, has a large influence in the decisions of the rest of the political actors.
The first contingent factor is the personality of the leaders. A contingent factor is that factor that is subjected to change; the personality of leaders, then, has different effects depending on the chancellor that is in power. As Poguntke points out (2005: 63), three main chancellors were outstanding in leadership: Adenauer, Kohl and Schröder. The first one, Konrad Adenauer, was the first chancellor after the war and his strong personal style in the chancellorship caused some concern in the Allies, because they began to think that the executive was not constrained enough. Fortunately for them, the next chancellors were less dominant figures. The other prominent leaders, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder, used extensively the negotiation role to impose their position using their charisma.
Finally, the second contingent factor is the political context. The political circumstances affect political decisions and can promote a mediocre politician to a good one and vice versa. Furthermore, in extraordinary circumstances, the executive chief could enhance his powers. For instance, one political context especially relevant in German history is the reunification. In this process, the aforementioned chancellor Kohl had a very significant paper. With few international support for the reunification, he presented the Ten-Point Program in order to reach his goal. The chancellor achieved –using his charisma, appealing to this unique context, and with solid arguments– that other powers changed their mind and adapted his posture in order to reach the reunified Germany. It seems clear that with another political context and with another leader, the result would have been completely different, but under these circumstances –and enhancing his powers– Kohl could become the leader of the reunified Germany.
To sum up, it has been observed that the five factors have influenced in the executive arena and that has been illustrated with several examples. Therefore, presidentialization has occurred in Germany.
Conclusions
The research question of this paper is whether consensus democracy prevents from presidentialization. To answer this, it has been explained, following Lijphart’s book, what the patterns of democracy are and we have realized that Germany fulfills all the characteristics of consensus democracy. After that, the concept of presidentialization has been defined and in which arenas it takes place and which factors contribute to the process has been described. From the factors that are related to the executive arena –because is the arena more affected by consensus democracy–, it has been held that presidentialization is occurring in German democracy.
From only the German case, the final conclusion of this paper cannot be extrapolated to all the consensus countries for three reasons: first, there are contingent factors that change from country to country; second, the structural ones are not equally important to all countries, and, lastly, not all consensus countries have fulfilled perfectly Lijphart’s ten characteristics. Nevertheless, Germany is a clear consensus country and, therefore, it seems that it has to be more protected against presidentialization; thus, the changes towards presidentialization that have been observed in this country must be taken into consideration for other fewer consensus countries, because this process is probably going further there.
Finally, it has been concluded that consensus democracy does not prevent from presidentialization; it implies that presidentialization cannot be easily curbed. Therefore, possible further research could be done to answer how presidentialization can be stopped, whether it is necessary to try to curb this process, or the analysis of the effects of this process on the quality of democracy in our societies. These questions were out of the scope of this paper; however, herein some interesting facts related to them can be found.
References
Karvonen, L. (2007). “The Personalization of Politics: What does research tell us so far, and what further research is in order?”. Papers for 4th ECPR Conference. Pisa.
Jeffery, C. (2003). “Federalism and Territorial Politics”. In Padgett, S., Paterson, W. E., Smith, G. (eds.). Developments in German Politics. Duke University Press, Durham.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Poguntke, T. (2009). “The German Core Executive: Ever More Power to the Chancellor?”. Paper for American Political Science Annual Meeting. Toronto.
Poguntke, T. (2005). “A Presidential Party State? The Federal Republic of Germany”. In Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (eds.). The Presidentialization of Politics: a Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (2005). “The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis”. In Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (eds.). The Presidentialization of Politics: a Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sodaro, M. J. (2008). Comparative politics. A global introduction. McGrawHill, New York.
Schmidt, M. G.(2003). Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
After World War II, the Allied Powers designed an institutional framework for Germany that constrained the executive power of the new regime and dispersed its competences. The reason to convert Germany into a semi-sovereign state was the strong and powerful executive of the previous years (Schmidt, 2003: 26). However, is it possible that the main leader of the executive (the chancellor) could increase his formal and informal powers without significant changes in the Basic Law (German constitution)? In other words, does consensus democracy prevent from presidentialization?
This paper is divided into three sections. In the first one, the patterns of democracy (Lijphart, 1999), especially the consensus model, are explained. Moreover, it is demonstrated that Germany belongs to the consensus pattern. In the second one, the process of presidentialization is presented as the study of Poguntke & Webb (2005) has established. Herein, the concept is defined, the arenas where presidentialization occurs are described and the factors that contribute to them are listed. These arenas are the executive, the political party and the electoral process. In the third section, the question of the paper is answered focusing only on the executive arena of German politics. This arena is the most representative for German presidentialization, because the consensus democracy limits the power of the executive. Thus, the study of the possible changes towards presidentialization in this arena shows the effectiveness of consensual democracy to prevent this process. Finally, in the conclusion, it is held that presidentialization is occurring in Germany and consensus democracy cannot curb that. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to study the consequences of presidentialization in German democracy.
Consensus Democracy
In 1999, Lijphart published a very useful tool to classify democracies. He identifies in his book (Lijphart, 1999) two different patterns of democracy: the Westminster or majoritarian model and the consensus model. On the one hand, the first model –Lijphart establishes– is “the government by the majority and in accordance with the majority’s wishes” (1999: 2). This majoritarian model “concentrates political power in the hands of a bare majority” and is an “exclusive, competitive and adversial” (ibid.) model of democracy. On the other hand, the second model is a democracy “characterized by inclusiveness, bargaining, and compromise”, the consensus model “tries to share, disperse, and limit power in a variety of ways”; this government includes “as many people as possible” (ibid.). To exemplify the two patterns, Lijphart considers Great Britain (before Blair), Barbados and especially New Zealand (until 1996) as prototypes of majoritarian democracies. Switzerland, Belgium (after 1993) and the European Union are prototypes of consensus democracies.
The author identifies ten characteristics that differentiate the two models of democracy. These are divided into two separate dimensions with five characteristics in each one. The first dimension is labelled as executives-parties and the second as federal-unity. The ten characteristics are listed below and, according to Lijphart classification, Germany is situated in each one. The first five characteristics correspond to the executives-parties dimension and the latter five to the federal-unity dimension:
1.- Cabinets: concentration versus sharing of executive powers. Majoritarian democracy use to have cabinets consisting only of members of the same party, in consensus democracy normally “let all or most of the important parties share executive power in a broad coalition” (Lijphat, 1999: 34). Almost all the governments in the Western Germany and reunified Germany have been coalitions (Sodaro, 2008: 538).
2.- Executive-Legislative relations. In the Westminster model, the executive is situated in a prominent position in comparison with Parliament. In non-majoritarian models, there is a balance between these two powers. Germany is, clearly, a parliamentarian regime where the Bundestag (Lower House) and Bundesrat (Upper House) have strong powers.
3.- Party system. The first model tends to be a two-party system, while the second is a multiparty one. Schmidt claims that the German party system is changing “from pluralistic fragmentation to a polarized pluralism” (2003: 135); in any case, it is clear that Germany has a multiparty system.
4.- Electoral system. Westminster uses a majoritarian and disproportional method whereas consensus uses a proportional one. The German electoral system is highly complex, but its index of disproportionality is very low (Lijphart, 1999: 313), so it could be easily catalogued as a proportional electoral system.
5.- Interest groups. Pluralism is likely to be found in majoritarian models, whilst corporatism is typically in consensus. In Germany, the mediation of government among interest groups is used normally and, moreover, there are four peak association groups: business and labour organizations, and churches and farmers’ interest groups. These two facts are distinctive of corporativist countries.
6.- Division of power. The majoritarian model tends to have a unitary and centralized government, while the consensus model tends to have a federal and decentralized government. Germany is a Federal Republic and the power of Länder is protected by the Basic Law (art. 30). (Jeffery, 2003)
7.- Division of legislative power: Unicameralism vs. strong bicameralism. Lijphart points out two conditions for strong bicameralism both of which Germany accomplishes: firstly, the procedure to elect Upper House (Bundesrat) has to be different from the election of the members of Lower House (Bundestag), and, secondly, both houses must have similar powers in the legislation.
8.- Constitutional rigidity. Flexible constitutions are typical of the Westminster model, whereas constitutions that need special majorities to be changed are in consensual democracies. Germany has a rigid constitution that needs extraordinary majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat, and other requirements, to reform it.
9.- Judicial review of laws. Majoritarian models do not have constitutional courts with powers to modify laws approved by Parliament, whilst the consensus model has strong judicial review institutions. The German ‘Federal Constitutional Court’ is considered as one of the most powerful judicial review institutions (Tsebelis, 2002: 231).
10.- Central banks. Executive-dependent central banks are normal in majoritarian models, while independent ones are common in consensus democracies. The Bundesbank was a strong and autonomous central bank and the European Central Bank maintains the main characteristics of the German one.
It can be observed that in each difference between the two patterns of democracy, Germany is situated in the consensus model. In the same way, Lijphart considers that Germany “could also have served as the prototype” of this pattern (1999: 249). Moreover, Poguntke states that “German democracy (. . .) should be characterized as ‘negotiation democracy’, where the power is dispersed between different levels and arenas of governance” (2005: 66); these are also the attributes of consensus democracy.
Therefore, Germany has been chosen for our case of study because it is a well-known country and it is a good example of consensual democracy . This country is used to see the influence of presidentialization in consensual democracies.
Presidentialization
Poguntke and Webb have defined presidentialization as “a process by which regimes are becoming more presidential in their actual practice without, in most cases, changing their formal structure, that is, their regime-type” (2005: 1). This section, following the study of Poguntke and Webb, is divided into three parts. Firstly, the effects caused by presidential regime are explained, because this regime is the model for presidentializations. Secondly, the arenas or faces where presidentialization occurs are described. Lastly, the factors that contribute to this process, which can be structural or contingent, are pointed out.
The authors have claimed that the presidential regime is essential to understand the process of presidentialization, because it is the model that the dynamics of other regimes follow. Therefore, in their study three broad effects caused by this regime are identified. First, the competences granted to the president let him govern without important external interferences from other powers, because in this type of regime he is not responsible to the Parliament. Second, the institutional position of the president gives autonomy to the leader from the pressure of the party. Finally, the personalization –the prominence of the leader at the expense of parties and collective identities (Karvonen, 2007: 4)– in the electoral process influence the result of elections.
These three effects allow the authors to establish three arenas or faces where the presidentialization takes place. The first one is used for the research question, the other ones are succinctly explained for the sake of completeness. To start with, the executive arena. In this face, the leader tends to expand his power toward the rest of the cabinet and the legislative power. In the second place, the party arena. The leader of the political party tends to enhance his powers weakening the territorial leaders and he also takes control of party machinery. In the last place, the electoral arena. The focus on the personality and charisma of the leader is brought by the media brings to candidate-centred campaigns, and the ideology, electoral program and parties are relegated.
Two groups of factors explain the process of presidentialization. According to Poguntke and Webb, these groups are: structural factors and contingent factors. The structural group includes four factors: internationalization of politics, growth and complexity of the state, changing structure of mass communication and erosion of political cleavages. The first two affect only the executive arena, and the fourth, the electoral process; while the third influences the three arenas. Regarding the contingent group, the authors have identified two factors: the personality of leaders and the political context, which also affect the three arenas.
In the next section, the executive arena and its related factors are used to study the effect of presidentialization in German consensus democracy. It is important to remember, then, that the factors which influence this arena are internationalization of politics, growth and complexity of the state, changing structure of mass communication, the personality of leaders and the political context.
Presidentialization in German consensus democracy
Germany has been classified previously as a consensus democracy. Moreover, this country is considered as a semi-sovereign state and a Parteienstaat (party state) (Schmidt, 2003: Chapter 2; Poguntke, 2005: 63). The power of the chancellor, as a consequence of this pattern of democracy, is restrained and with fewer competences than other executives such as the Prime Minister of United Kingdom. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the chancellor’s position, according to the Basic Law, is more powerful than the rest of the members of the cabinet and has a certain stability from the Parliament due to the “constructive vote of no confidence” (Basic Law, art. 67); however, the executive power is dispersed and limited. Surprisingly, the chancellor has taken advantage of the resources of his position, and the process of presidentialization has occurred. The executive arena and the contingent and structural factors that affect this arena are used to examine how this process has occurred in Germany after World War II.
The first structural factor is the internationalization of politics. In Europe, two main processes are enhancing this factor: globalization (common to the entire world) and Europeanization (exclusive of members of the European Union); these processes are essential for the state and, hence, the foreign policy is also fundamental. The chancellor directly leads this policy; moreover, international and European summits contribute to the personification of politics and due to that, the chancellor enhances his powers at the expense of Parliament and Länder. However, it is important to remark that these international processes produce a loss of sovereignty of the states and that affects, also, the competences of the executive.
The second structural factor is the growth and complexity of the state. In the last 60 years, the states have increased their competences and they have specialized their departments. In the case of Germany, it is also a federal state and, then, its complexity is larger. Therefore, the chancellor has to deal with this complexity with restrained powers. He has the “pivotal role as chief negotiator in the negotiations” (Poguntke, 2009: 13) and that is the key to managing this complexity. This key has also contributed to enhancing his executive powers. Two examples of this negotiation role are listed. For example, the increasing powers of Bundesrat in the legislation have required several negotiations and the chancellor is the mediator between Land governments, federal government and the Parliament. Second example, Germany is a corporativist country and that “has given rise to a tradition of policy-making through special commissions and advisory councils that put the chancellor (. . .) at the centre stage” (Poguntke, 2005: 69). Finally, as coordinator of the executive and chief negotiator, the chancellor’s office (Bundeskanzleramt) has had to increase its size. According to data presented in Poguntke (2005: 70), Adenauer’s office had 120 staff, whereas in the late 1990s, it increased to 500, “which makes it one of the largest of its kind in Western Europe” (ibid.).
The third structural factor is the changing structure of mass communication. Poguntke & Webb have stated that the important changes in the mass media in the last 50 years have provided a “crucial power resource for chief executives to dominate their government” (2005: 17). The focus of media in the leadership of the chancellor gives him a preeminent position at the expense of the cabinet and the party. In other words, the media is expecting an opinion of the chancellor in each political issue and his posture, formally or informally, has a large influence in the decisions of the rest of the political actors.
The first contingent factor is the personality of the leaders. A contingent factor is that factor that is subjected to change; the personality of leaders, then, has different effects depending on the chancellor that is in power. As Poguntke points out (2005: 63), three main chancellors were outstanding in leadership: Adenauer, Kohl and Schröder. The first one, Konrad Adenauer, was the first chancellor after the war and his strong personal style in the chancellorship caused some concern in the Allies, because they began to think that the executive was not constrained enough. Fortunately for them, the next chancellors were less dominant figures. The other prominent leaders, Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder, used extensively the negotiation role to impose their position using their charisma.
Finally, the second contingent factor is the political context. The political circumstances affect political decisions and can promote a mediocre politician to a good one and vice versa. Furthermore, in extraordinary circumstances, the executive chief could enhance his powers. For instance, one political context especially relevant in German history is the reunification. In this process, the aforementioned chancellor Kohl had a very significant paper. With few international support for the reunification, he presented the Ten-Point Program in order to reach his goal. The chancellor achieved –using his charisma, appealing to this unique context, and with solid arguments– that other powers changed their mind and adapted his posture in order to reach the reunified Germany. It seems clear that with another political context and with another leader, the result would have been completely different, but under these circumstances –and enhancing his powers– Kohl could become the leader of the reunified Germany.
To sum up, it has been observed that the five factors have influenced in the executive arena and that has been illustrated with several examples. Therefore, presidentialization has occurred in Germany.
Conclusions
The research question of this paper is whether consensus democracy prevents from presidentialization. To answer this, it has been explained, following Lijphart’s book, what the patterns of democracy are and we have realized that Germany fulfills all the characteristics of consensus democracy. After that, the concept of presidentialization has been defined and in which arenas it takes place and which factors contribute to the process has been described. From the factors that are related to the executive arena –because is the arena more affected by consensus democracy–, it has been held that presidentialization is occurring in German democracy.
From only the German case, the final conclusion of this paper cannot be extrapolated to all the consensus countries for three reasons: first, there are contingent factors that change from country to country; second, the structural ones are not equally important to all countries, and, lastly, not all consensus countries have fulfilled perfectly Lijphart’s ten characteristics. Nevertheless, Germany is a clear consensus country and, therefore, it seems that it has to be more protected against presidentialization; thus, the changes towards presidentialization that have been observed in this country must be taken into consideration for other fewer consensus countries, because this process is probably going further there.
Finally, it has been concluded that consensus democracy does not prevent from presidentialization; it implies that presidentialization cannot be easily curbed. Therefore, possible further research could be done to answer how presidentialization can be stopped, whether it is necessary to try to curb this process, or the analysis of the effects of this process on the quality of democracy in our societies. These questions were out of the scope of this paper; however, herein some interesting facts related to them can be found.
References
Karvonen, L. (2007). “The Personalization of Politics: What does research tell us so far, and what further research is in order?”. Papers for 4th ECPR Conference. Pisa.
Jeffery, C. (2003). “Federalism and Territorial Politics”. In Padgett, S., Paterson, W. E., Smith, G. (eds.). Developments in German Politics. Duke University Press, Durham.
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries. Yale University Press, New Haven and London.
Poguntke, T. (2009). “The German Core Executive: Ever More Power to the Chancellor?”. Paper for American Political Science Annual Meeting. Toronto.
Poguntke, T. (2005). “A Presidential Party State? The Federal Republic of Germany”. In Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (eds.). The Presidentialization of Politics: a Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (2005). “The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis”. In Poguntke, T. & Webb, P. (eds.). The Presidentialization of Politics: a Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Sodaro, M. J. (2008). Comparative politics. A global introduction. McGrawHill, New York.
Schmidt, M. G.(2003). Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.
FRANCESC MESTRE
Estudiante de Ciencias Políticas
No hay comentarios:
Publicar un comentario